THE  PLA NAVY'S  DEVELOPING  STRATEGY ● 原作：（美）伯纳德·D·科尔 
● 编译：（中）邢蓬宇

【编者按】本文编译自美国著名智库詹姆斯敦基金会最新一期的《中国问题简报》，原作者为伯纳德·D·科尔（Bernard D. Cole）。他是美国研究中国海军问题的著名学者，著有《海上长城——迈向21世纪的中国海军》一书。编译者邢蓬宇为中国人民解放军军事科学院研究生部硕士研究生。

　　本文介绍了近年来解放军海军的现代化发展。值得关注的是，文章中提出了“台湾问题解决后中国海军发展的战略问题”，这种提法在国际上研究中国海军发展的文章中尚属首次出现。一方面说明中国海军的发展已经充分引起了外国军事专家的关注，走向远洋的海上力量已初具雏形；另一方面也说明崛起的中国已经是一个国际公认的事实。在部分外国学者看来，长期以来被认为是中国战略困局的“台湾问题”已经无法阻挡中国走向海洋、走向世界的步伐，因此才会提出“台湾问题解决后中国海军发展的战略问题”这一前瞻性的命题。

中国已经享受到长期以来为建立一支新式海军所做出的不懈努力的成果，它的海上力量足以使其对手感到头疼，尤其是台湾、日本和美国。

　　尽管解放军海军的现代化计划是全方位的，但潜艇部队始终是发展的重点。如果解放军海军受命进行针对台湾的军事行动，无论是执行封锁任务还是海上隔离行动，潜艇都是最有战斗力的作战平台。此外，威慑以及在必要情况下阻滞甚至是击败可能干预台湾事务的美国海军，潜艇部队也是解放军最具战斗力的军事力量。上述提及的众多任务之重的“威慑”对于北京而言并不是一个切实可行目标。因为美国行政当局，无论是民主党还是共和党政府，都坚持和平解决台湾问题的立场。尽管1979年的《与台湾关系法》没有正式承诺美国将使用军事手段干涉台湾事务，仅仅是在克林顿政府时期，为了应对北京挑衅式的导弹测试和军事演习，于1996年春派遣了两支航母战斗群到台湾地区，作为未来可能进行军事干预的信号。

　　对于北京而言，阻滞对台海事务进行干涉的外国海军是一个可行性更高的目标，因为中国已经拥有了令人畏惧的潜艇部队，而且还不断地为其进行现代化升级。包括用较为先进的宋级和基洛级潜艇替换老式的罗米欧级（033型）和明级常规动力潜艇。其中宋级是中国自行生产，基洛级则是从俄罗斯采购。这一双重采购计划得益于中国不断增长的外汇储备和科技实力大为改善的国防科技工业的发展。

现代化的中国海军

　　解放军海军还对其规模相对较小的核潜艇部队进行升级，5艘老式的汉级核动力潜艇正在接受现代化改装，而且将来该级潜艇很可能被093型核动力潜艇取代。目前已有1艘093型核潜艇投入使用，此外至少还有1艘已经下水。中国过去在部署弹道导弹核潜艇方面所遭受的挫折将随着094型弹道导弹核潜艇的（目前正在建造中）的部署而彻底改变。目前至少已有1艘094型潜艇下水，该型潜艇最后的生产数量仍未可知，但至少在3艘以上。

　　中国潜艇部队的另一个重要发展计划就是为常规动力潜艇配备先进的“不依赖空气的潜艇推动系统”（AIP）。一套AIP系统能使常规动力潜艇在水下潜航时间长达40天（低速状态），而不用像以往那样每四天左右就必须上浮充电。该技术对于增强常规动力潜艇部队的威慑能力十分重要，同时还能避免发展核动力潜艇所需的巨额军费。

　　中国海军在着力发展潜艇部队的同时，也对其水面舰艇部队进行现代化升级。目前，解放军的主力水面舰艇部队由大约24艘相对先进的导弹护卫舰和驱逐舰组成，它们均装备有先进的动力系统和舰对舰导弹系统。但是这些水面舰艇的弱点也很明显——“防空和反潜能力不足”。直到2004年，解放军海军才开始使用三艘具备区域防空能力的旅洋级驱逐舰，分别为Luyang I、 Luyang II 和 Luzhou。解放军似乎想通过部署该级驱逐舰以增强舰队的“区域防空能力”。这种能力使舰船不但能为自身提供防空能力，还可以为整个编队提供防空能力。未来，无论是应对美国海军的特遣舰队还是为进攻台湾的船队提供护航，“区域防空能力”对于舰队的海上作战都至关重要。依旧存在的弱点

　　过去5年中，北京为其雄心勃勃的海军现代化计划进行了大量的投资。然而，即便是在输送各种部队横渡台湾海峡遂行登陆作战方面，这些投资目前还没能使海军部队的整体作战能力得到彻底的提升。解放军海军的另一个弱点是在“水雷战”方面。中国海军相对老式的扫雷艇也就是在最近才开始使用上个世纪90年代末的水雷捕获与清除系统。相对而言，中国海军的布雷能力更令人感到畏惧，这在未来针对台湾的海上作战中将是一个有力的工具。

　　中国海军航空兵依旧是海军诸多领域中实力最弱的一环。然而，对于解放军而言这并不是一个致命的弱点，中国大陆在靠近台湾海峡的一面有许多空军的机场，空军与海军航空兵之间的协调也日渐增强。因此，这就很好理解中国海军在提升它的舰载直升机能力的同时，它的岸基战斗机和空中攻击平台发展依旧受限。此外，中国海军的空中反潜和侦察能力也是相当薄弱的一环，而且目前该领域也得不到空军的支持。

一个新的海洋战略？

　　北京正在制定一个新的海洋战略以指导未来海军的运用。1949年海军成立后，它被赋予的主要任务就是“独立或与陆军、空军一起，遏制和抵御来自海上的武装入侵，捍卫国家领土主权、维护国家海洋权益和保障国家行使海上权力”。

　　尽管上述任务在过去半个世纪以来始终是中国海军的主要使命，但是2004年的国防白皮书明确承认了一个重要的变化。尽管中国传统上比较重视地面部队，白皮书中却指出“人民解放军在继续重视陆军建设的同时，加强海军、空军和第二炮兵建设，谋求作战力量结构协调发展，提高夺取制海权、制空权以及战略反击能力。”

　　在海军方面，2004版的国防白皮书反复阐述了海军的责任“海军担负着保卫国家海上方向安全、维护领海主权和海洋权益的任务”它还进一步强调遂行近海作战的重要性，“海军扩大近海防御作战空间和防御纵深，加强、完善海战场建设，增强在近海遂行海上战役的综合作战能力和核反击能力”。白皮书还进一步指出“……突出海上作战兵力特别是两栖作战兵力建设。加快更新海军武器装备，重点发展新型作战舰艇，以及多种专用飞机和配套装备，提高武器装备的信息化水平和远程精确打击能力。参加诸军兵种联合演练，提高联合作战能力和海上综合保障能力。”

　　上述任务对于现代海军而言并非特别，但是对于解放军海军而言却具有方向性的指导作用。首要和最重要的目标就是台湾。中国海军过去15年间，尤其是自从1995-1996间的台海危机后的现代化进程，十分明显地是为了将来有可能因为台湾地位问题而导致的武装冲突做准备，武装冲突的主战场很可能是在海上。

　　对于目前正在制定的海军战略而言，一个需要解决的重要问题就是“台湾之后”将如何？也就是说，在台湾问题解决后，指导中国海军运用的将是什么？一个很可能的战略就是强调传统的制海权，以是否能保护国家海洋利益作为评估海军能力的标准。

　　去年中国重申了对东海的主权声明，在此之后日本就成为仅次于台湾的重点关注的目标。而对日本的关注与对海上交通线的保护密切相关，每年中国从海外大量进口的能源主要通过海路运抵中国。对解放军海军而言，海上交通线（无论是近岸、区域性、区域内、全球）的保护还是一个软肋。如果北京将新的海洋战略聚焦于海上交通线的保护，那么还需要解决好以下几个问题：首先，北京需要为该战略寻找一个合适的对手，目前的海盗和恐怖事件并不是恰当的理由；其次，目前美国和其他国家的海军能够确保各国在公海的自由航行，如果北京将目前主要对滨海地区的关注转到对海上交通线的保护上，这就意味着北京对现有的海上秩序失去信心；最后，中国需要改变经济发展的重点，将大量的资源投入到海军建设上，使其足以保护主要通往西亚、南亚海区和中东的海上交通线。一战和二战中保护北大西洋海上交通线的历史实践证明，要达到对海上交通线的保护与控制是困难重重的。因此，北京在着手制定一个大规模的海军扩充计划前，应该先解决为实现该目标而必须优先发展的经济、工业、国防项目。

　　另一个影响中国海洋战略的因素是其悠久的主要作为大陆国家的历史传统。尽管拥有14000公里的漫长海岸线和5000多个岛屿，中国对于国家安全威胁的判断长久以来始终集中在陆上而非海洋。进一步说，解放军内部目前还是由陆军占据支配地位，只有当来自海洋方向的对中国国家利益造成巨大冲击的威胁得以确定时，海军的地位才会得到提升。尽管中国的领导人已经意识到海洋利益对于国家经济和政治的巨大作用，但是以保护海上交通线尤其是保护海上能源通道为重点的海洋战略还没有对国家安全政策的制定过程起到支配性作用。目前海军的现代化也主要得益于不断增加的国防费用，而并不是海军装备的采购在整个军事采购中已经成为重点。

　　处于现代化进程中的中国海军目前已经具备执行许多保护国家海上利益的任务，包括应对可能出现的台海危机。虽然中国海军会对美国海军有可能的军事干涉感到愤怒，但是无论是在东海还是在从印度洋到中东的海上交通线上，以中国海军目前的实力还不足以对美国、日本，甚至是印度海军造成根本性的威胁。因此，中国的海洋战略只处于一个发展过程当中。然而一旦该战略得到确定，那么就为台湾问题解决后，中国海军的发展指明方向，包括在太平洋和印度洋的公海上进行扩张。

 

THE PLA NAVY'S DEVELOPING STRATEGY

China is now deploying the fruits of a dedicated effort to build a new navy, one capable of confronting modern maritime opponents, especially Taiwan, Japan and the United States. While the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is modernizing in almost all areas, it has placed an emphasis on developing its submarine force. If the PLAN is ordered into action against Taiwan, it has evidently decided that submarines are the most effective platforms both to isolate the island by blockade or quarantine, and also as the most effective way to deter, and if necessary delay and even defeat, U.S. naval intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.

The first of these goals―deterrence―does not seem to be a viable objective for Beijing, since U.S. administrations―whether Democratic or Republican―have uniformly insisted that the China-Taiwan imbroglio must be resolved peacefully. While the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 does not formally commit the United States to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf, just such a commitment was signaled by President William Clinton’s dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the scene in the spring of 1996, in response to Beijing’s aggressive missiles tests and military exercises.   The second of these objectives―delaying intervening naval forces―is a more likely accomplishment, as China’s already formidable submarine force continues to modernize. This process includes the replacement or augmentation of old Romeo and Ming-class conventionally powered submarines by much more capable Song- and Kilo-class boats, the first indigenously produced and the second purchased from Russia. This dual acquisition program is the result of both China’s increasing foreign reserves and improved capability of the nation’s defense industry to produce modern weapons systems.   　　The Modernizing Navy   The PLAN is also renewing its small force of nuclear powered submarines (SSN); the five boats of the old Han-class are being augmented and will likely be replaced by the newly constructed Type 093-class SSN. The first of these is already operational and at least one more has been launched. China’s past failure to deploy an effective nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will soon change with the deployment of the Type 094 Jin-class SSBN currently under construction. At least one of these has been launched; while the final number to be built is unknown, at least three will probably be constructed.   The next likely step in the development of China’s submarine force will be incorporation of an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system into some of its boats. An AIP system enables a conventionally powered submarine to remain submerged for up to 40 days (at slow speed) instead of the usual four days before snorkeling is required for the diesel engine to recharge its batteries. This technology significantly increases the threat posed by a conventionally powered submarine, while avoiding the expense of nuclear powered construction.   China is also modernizing its force of surface warships. The current fleet of approximately two dozen relatively modern guided missile-equipped frigates and destroyers are all powered by modern engineering plants and are equipped with potent surface-to-surface cruise missiles. This force remains significantly limited, however, in the crucial areas of anti-submarine (ASW) and anti-air (AAW) warfare. It is only since the 2004 commissioning of three new classes of destroyers―the Luyang I, the Luyang II and the Luzhou―that the PLAN seems to have deployed ships capable of “area AAW”. This important capability enables a single ship to provide anti-aircraft defense not just for itself, but also for a formation of ships. This capability is crucial to fleet operations at sea, whether against a U.S. naval task force or for escorting an amphibious task force against Taiwan.   　　Limitations Remain   Beijing has also made a significant investment in its amphibious lift capability during the past five years. This process has not produced a dramatically more capable force, however, in terms of the ability to transport multiple divisions across even the Taiwan Strait to conduct an opposed landing. Another remaining PLAN limitation is in mine warfare. The Chinese navy’s relatively old minesweepers have only recently begun exercising with late 20th century mine hunting and clearance systems. The PLAN’s mine laying capability is more formidable, however, and this could serve as a powerful tool in a maritime campaign against Taiwan.   China’s naval aviation capability remains the PLAN’s least capable warfare community. Yet this is not a significant weakness given the proximity of Taiwan to the Chinese Air Force’s (PLAAF) many mainland bases, and the increasing integration of naval and air force aviation. Hence, it is understandable that while the PLAN continues to expand its ship-borne helicopter capabilities, its shore-based fighter and attack air assets remain limited. More serious for China’s maritime power, and not compensated for by the PLAAF, is the PLAN’s very limited airborne ASW and reconnaissance capability.   　　A New Maritime Strategy?   Beijing has been developing a new maritime strategy to guide the employment of the navy it is now putting to sea. When it was established in April 1949, the PLAN was assigned specific “primary missions” to “independently or jointly with the Army and Air Force, guard against enemy invasion from the sea, defend the state’s sovereignty over its territorial waters, and safeguard the state’s maritime rights and interests” .   While these missions remain applicable a half-century later, the 2004 Defense White Paper acknowledged a shift from China’s traditional focus on ground forces when it stated that “the PLA gives priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force to seek balanced development of the combat force structure, in order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air, and conducting strategic counter-strikes” .   In the maritime arena, the 2004 White Paper reiterated the navy’s responsibility “for safeguarding China's maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and interests.” It went on to emphasize the importance of conducting operations well offshore, timely “preparation for [the] maritime battlefield,” enhanced “integrated combat capabilities” and the ability to conduct “nuclear counter-attacks.” It further charged the PLAN with the importance of “building maritime combat forces, especially amphibious combat forces…[and] updating its weaponry and equipment,” to include “long-range precision strike capability…joint exercises…and integrated maritime support capabilities” .   These missions are not unusual for modern naval forces, but certain conditions point the missions in specific directions for the PLAN. First and foremost are the issues raised by Taiwan. China’s naval modernization during the past 15 years, and especially since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, has clearly been focused on preparing for a possible armed conflict over the island’s status, a conflict that would almost certainly feature a maritime scenario. This contingency has provided the basic rationale for the ongoing naval modernization programs that, while striking in terms of capability, have been moderate in terms of pace and priority.   The key question for the continuing development of maritime strategy in China is “What beyond Taiwan?” That is, what will guide the employment of the PLAN following resolution of the Taiwan issue? A likely strategy will emphasize classic command of the sea, defined as the naval ability to defend vital national maritime interests.   Second only to Taiwan is Beijing’s concern with future Japanese actions, especially over China’s sovereignty claims in the East China Sea. This concern ties directly to a more general and increasing worry about securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) upon which increasing amounts of China’s imported energy resources depend. SLOC defense―coastal, regional, inter-regional, global―remains ill defined for the PLAN. Focusing its maritime strategy on SLOC defense will require addressing several significant factors. First, Beijing would have to delineate a threat justifying such a strategy; current piracy and terrorism issues do not qualify. Second, the U.S. and other navies currently maintain free navigation on the high seas; a Chinese decision that PLAN efforts in non-coastal waters are required for SLOC defense would mean Beijing’s loss of faith in the present international maritime regime. Finally, China would have to alter national economic development priorities to allocate the extensive resources required to build a navy even partially capable of defending China’s very long SLOCs to Southwest Asia and the Middle East. The scope that such an effort would require is indicated by the difficulty of protecting the North Atlantic SLOCs during World War I and II. Hence, national priorities pose major issues with which the Chinese government would have to solve, before embarking on a massive PLAN expansion program.   Also affecting maritime strategic development in China is its history as primarily a continental nation. Despite its long coastline of over 14,000 kilometers and more than 5,000 islands, China’s view of national security threats has almost always focused on continental rather than maritime dangers. Furthermore, the PLA remains dominated by the army, with the navy apparently able to exert influence in intra-service debates only as strong as specific maritime-associated national interests are able to justify. China’s leaders are well aware of maritime interests as vital elements in their nation’s economic health and their own political legitimacy, but China’s priority for SLOC defense, especially concerns for the security of its overseas energy supplies, does not dominate its national security policy process. Current PLAN modernization is fueled more by increased national revenues than by a general reordering of military budgeting priorities.   China’s modernizing navy is already capable of carrying out many missions in defense of maritime security interests, including those involved in Taiwan’s status. While it certainly poses a thought-provoking challenge to possible U.S. naval intervention in such a scenario, the PLAN is not yet able to pose a significant threat to open-ocean naval operations by the U.S., Japanese or Indian navies, either in the East China Sea or over the long SLOCs that run from the Indian Ocean to the Middle East. Hence, China’s maritime strategy is very much a work in progress, with its most likely direction to be an expanded view of post-Taiwan missions involving the high seas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.